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Democratic institutions and state-society relations shape governance arrangements and expectations between
public and private stakeholders about public health impact. We illustrate this with a comparison between the
English Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD) and the Dutch ‘All About Health. . .’ (AaH) programme. As mani-
festations of a Whole-of-Society approach, in which governments, civil society and business take responsibility for
the co-production of economic utility and good health, these programmes are two recent collaborative platforms
based on voluntary agreements to improve public health. Using a ‘most similar cases’ design, we conducted a
comparative secondary analysis of data from the evaluations of the two programmes. The underlying rationale of
both programmes was that voluntary agreements would be better suited than regulation to encourage business
and civil society to take more responsibility for improving health. Differences between the two included: expect-
ations of an enforcing versus facilitative role for government; hierarchical versus horizontal coordination; big
business versus civil society participants; top-down versus bottom-up formulation of voluntary pledges and
progress monitoring for accountability versus for learning and adaptation. Despite the attempt in both
programmes to base voluntary commitments on trust, the English ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and adversarial state-
society relationships conditioned non-governmental parties to see the pledges as controlling, quasi-contractual
agreements that were only partially lived up to. The Dutch consensual political tradition enabled a civil society-
based understanding and gradual acceptance of the pledges as the internalization by partner organizations of
public health values within their operations. We conclude that there are institutional limitations to the imple-
mentation of generic trust-building and learning-based models of change ‘Whole-of-Society’ approaches.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction
In public health policy, alternative types of social coordinationbetween the classical hierarchical state, the market and civil society
have emerged since the 1970s.1–3 These have been characterized as a
move ‘from government to governance’.4–6 In contrast to the old
state-centric theory that focussed merely on unilateral governmental
‘steering’ through regulation, command-and-control and public
service provision, which is to an important extent still the default
mode in public health policies, modern governance theories take a
wider view of the whole repertoire of modes of social coordination for
collective action by state and society,5,7,8 and how these have been
institutionalized in governance arrangements.8,9 How public health
policies converge or diverge across countries over time can be
analyzed and explained using comparative institutional analysis,
thereby clarifying under which institutional conditions an alternative
governance mode for public health is likely to achieve its goals.10,11
Due to different institutional starting conditions, welfare states have
developed different state-society relations over time, resulting in
different governance arrangements. For instance, the majoritarian
democracy of the United Kingdom produces adversarial and short-
term state-society relationships because a change of government can
produce sharp ideological shifts in policy. To retain continuity of public
administration in such situations, the United Kingdom has a hierarch-
ical and relatively centralized government.12,13 In contrast, in some
continental European countries, governance emerged out of generally
devolving public tasks to semi-public or publicly licensed private not-
for-profit organisations, thereby setting the foundations for distinct
welfare state governance arrangements.14,15 In the Netherlands, this is
known as the ‘poldermodel’—a system of consensus-based democracy
that allows for longer term relationships between state and society, and
the gradual uptake and modification of new ideas over time.16
In this article, we show how these different institutional contexts
and governance arrangements have shaped the developmental
trajectories of two apparently similar public health governance
programmes: the English Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD)
and the Dutch ‘All About Health. . .’ (AaH) programme. The
perceived success or failure of the programmes in terms of their
impacts such as on behaviour and health falls beyond the scope of
this article.
Towards a new social contract between state and
society
In 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued the Adelaide
Statement proposing a new ‘social contract’ that has become known
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as the ‘Whole-of-Society’ (WoS) approach, aimed at inducing both
public and private actors (governments, civil society and business) to
take responsibility for the co-production of economic utility and
good health.1,3 WoS approaches typically reflect collaborative
governance arrangements and platforms across state and society,
bringing different capacities together, enabling tailored solutions
and offering space for early conflict resolution.17,18 One manifest-
ation of this is the establishment of public–private partnerships
(PPPs) and voluntary agreements designed to improve public
health, either in lieu of state regulation or as a supplement.
The English Public Health RD and the Dutch AaH programmes
are two recent examples of this phenomenon with very similar goals.
In both cases, the notion of the ‘social contract’ is manifest through
use of so called ‘pledges’. These are presented as voluntary
agreements whereby non-state actors express their commitment to
public health improvement goals. While the Dutch programme was
extended in 2016 for five more years to 2021,19 the English
programme was quietly wound down by government from 2015.
Why was this so? Since neither programme met the presumed re-
quirements for effective voluntary agreements identified from the
literature,20 this cannot explain their different trajectories. Instead,
we look to the way in which each programme and its supporting
governance arrangements relate to its institutional context.10
Methods
A ‘most similar cases’ design11,21 allows us to understand the way
institutions shape novel policy and coordination initiatives such as
the RD and AaH. We conducted a qualitative comparative secondary
analysis of data from the evaluations of the two programmes to
explain the similarities and differences between two programmes
with seemingly very similar goals. Each evaluation included a
literature review, analysis of pledges and public documents, and
qualitative interviews (44 interviews with 50 individuals plus six
qualitative organizational case studies in the RD study; 85
interviews in the AaH study) with purposive samples of direct par-
ticipants such as government officials, programme implementers
and pledge signatories, and non-participant stakeholders in the
public and private sectors. In both studies, interviews covered:
aims, objectives and activities; pledges and network development;
motivations for participation; experienced barriers and facilitators;
perceived strengths and weaknesses; necessary improvements
including requirements for sustainable action; costs and achieve-
ments; and future expectations.22,23
Results
Characterizing the two programmes
English public health responsibility deal
The RD was launched by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat
Coalition Government in 2011 as a PPP between government,
business, the public sector and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to improve public health in the areas of food, alcohol,
health at work and physical activity.24 ‘Five core commitments’
defined the scope, purpose and ambitions of the RD, which all
partners had to make (see table 1).
Andrew Lansley, then Secretary of State for Health, asserted that,
By working in partnership, public health, commercial, and
voluntary organisations can agree practical actions to secure
more progress, more quickly, with less cost than legislation.
. . .. . .., we shouldn’t be scared to use the reach of businesses to
achieve mutually beneficial aims. Put simply, commercial organ-
isations can reach individuals in ways that other organisations,
Government included, cannot.24 (p. 2).
The RD was overseen by a Plenary Group (chaired by the
Secretary of State for Health), and consisted of four networks
chaired by either topic experts or participants in the sector: Food,
Alcohol, Health at Work and Physical Activity. Each network
had Steering and Working groups consisting of representatives of
participating sectors, and developed collective pledges (see table 2).
Partners were required to sign to at least one collective pledge from
any of the networks, could develop individual pledges and had to
produce delivery plans as well as annual progress reports. The
Department of Health (DH) placed these on a dedicated part of
its website.24 By March 2016, 776 organizations had pledged to par-
ticipate in the RD.
The Dutch ‘All About Health. . .’ programme
At the request of Parliament, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and
Sport (HWS) developed a National Prevention Programme (NPP)
in 2012 to connect the ‘predominantly small-scale, fragmented and
ad hoc health initiatives in society’, and increase collaboration,
scaling up and focus25 (p. 4). It comprises existing legislation as
well as government-led health programmes and a newly added
‘health movement’, called AaH, in which societal partners pledge
to take initiatives to achieve public health goals.
The long-term goals of the NPP are to reduce chronic conditions
(such as diabetes and depression) as well as smoking, alcohol abuse,
physical inactivity and obesity, and to counter growing health
disparities. Within the NPP, AaH, using a bottom-up approach
aims to help develop a ‘social movement for a healthier and more
vital Netherlands’25 (p. 8), inviting societal partners with inspiring
health initiatives to engage with it. Partner commitment to the AaH
is via a ‘pledge’: ‘a public statement by which an organisation
expresses commitment and an active contribution to the realization
of governmental health goals by conducting specific activities.’
(www.allesisgezondheid.nl) Pledges do not impose any mandatory
requirements and partners can formulate their own pledges. ‘Each
partner is responsible for the activities and results in their own
domain, can be peer reviewed by other partners, and will be
publicly held accountable’25 (p. 16). By January 2018, 374 pledges
had been signed by 684 organizations with another 2200 organiza-
tions involved in the domains of the neighbourhood, school, work,
healthcare and health protection. Of the pledges, 63% are collabora-
tive, involving multiple partners across different domains.26,27 The
Ministry of HWS funds a small Programme Office, publishing the
signing of pledges on social media, acquiring new partners and
pledges, and organizing regular events for knowledge exchange.
Progress is reported to Parliament at least once a year, informed
by monitoring and evaluation reports from the Programme Office
and independent academic research commissioned by the
Table 1 ‘Five core commitments’ defining the scope, purpose and ambitions of the RD
RD Core commitments
1. We (business, NGOs and public bodies joining the RD) recognize that we have a vital role to play in improving people’s health.
2. We will encourage and enable people to adopt a healthier diet.
3. We will foster a culture of responsible drinking, which will help people to drink within guidelines.
4. We will encourage and assist people to become more physically active.
5. We will actively support our workforce to lead healthier lives (Department of Health, 2011).
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Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development
(ZonMw).
See table 3 for examples of pledges.
Similarities and differences between the RD and AaH
programmes
A prominent similarity between the RD and AaH consists of the
underlying rationale that voluntary agreements are better suited
than regulation to engage business and civil society to take respon-
sibility for health. Although both programmes were government
initiated, they considered the non-state ‘ownership’ of deals and
pledges as crucial, although neither has direct citizen representation
in its governance. Both had low entrance and exit thresholds,
without any sanctions for non-participation or non-compliance.
Finally, both governments have reported progress publicly
including to Parliament while making it clear that implementation
of pledges is the responsibility of partner organisations.19,28,29
The analysis of stakeholder interviews in both evaluations
identified similar motivations, experiences and reported achieve-
ments. In both programmes, non-health partners participated out
of intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivations, such as: public visibility
and recognition; acquiring status and legitimacy; and access to
networks and knowledge. Partners in both programmes expected
that their pledges would accelerate existing activities and health
awareness, but they also voiced concern over pledge delivery and
the benefits that were to be gained from programme
participation.30,31
A third similarity is that both programmes encountered pressures,
from political representatives, civil society or public health experts,
to be more public-facing, to formulate more specific and measurable
objectives, and to hold the pledge-partners accountable for their
contributions to these objectives and overall public health
goals.29,30,32,33 These pressures did not lead to significant changes
in programme management.
One of the main differences between the programmes is that the
RD promised ‘to secure more progress, more quickly, with less cost
than legislation’24 (p. 2) by involving business, while AaH promised
to connect existing yet fragmented initiatives in society and
encourage new ones into a health movement, often referred to as
‘turning drops into a wave’25 (p. 8) that would be complementary to
government action. This also generated distinctive expectations
about the role of government in each programme, and about
programme coordination. In the RD, the initial set of collective
pledges was formulated in a relatively top-down way by Networks
led by government-appointed representatives of industry before civil
society organizations were invited to join. All pledges had to be
approved not only by the Network chairs but also by the DH.
This implied a certain degree of supervision and follow up, which
was only partially adhered to.30 In AaH, the partners formulate their
own pledges and mobilise their own local partners and networks.
Government adhered to a facilitative role mainly.
Table 2 Examples of RD collective pledges across the four networks launched in March 2011
Name Why a pledge Who is involved What activities More info
Food Network Collective
pledge:F1: Out of home
calorie labelling
‘Out of home calorie
labelling aims to
inform and
empower people to
make healthier
choices more often
when eating out, as
well as
encouraging food
businesses to make
healthier options
more available’.
Catering businesses, who
sell food in out of home
settings; including super-
markets, fast food
companies, cafes
42 signatories with a
pledge delivery plan
5 signatories without
plan
‘We will provide calorie in-
formation for food and
non-alcoholic drink for our
customers in out of home
settings from 1 September
2011 in accordance with
the principles for calorie
labelling agreed by the
Responsibility Deal’.
http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20180201180712/https://
responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.
uk/f1-factsheet/
Alcohol network collective
pledge: A1: Alcohol
labelling
‘The . . .collective
pledges support
the core
commitment to
foster a culture of
responsible
drinking, which will
help people to
drink within
guidelines’.
Alcohol producers: ‘This
pledge commits alcohol
producers to label their
products with unit and
health information’.
81 signatories with a
pledge delivery plan
12 signatories without a
plan
‘We will ensure that over
80% of products on shelf
(by December 2013) will
have labels with clear unit
content, NHS guidelines
and a warning about
drinking when pregnant’.
http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20130104160317/http://
responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.
uk/2012/11/15/public-
health-responsibility-deal-
collective-pledges/
3 Physical Activity Network
collective pledge P1:
Physical activity:
Community
To encourage and
assist people to
become more
physically active; ‘A
healthy, active
population is good
for business and
the economy as a
whole’.
Business, voluntary,
community and other
organizations
99 ‘organizations
committed to this pledge’
‘We will use our local
presence to get more
children and adults more
active, more often
including engaging
communities in planning
and delivery’.
http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20180201181151/https://
responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.
uk/pledges/pledge/? pl=17
4 Health at Work Network
collective pledge H3:
Health and wellbeing
reports –
‘This pledge will raise
the profile of
employee health
and wellbeing and
ensure this issue is
integral to all
organizations’.
Employers large- and
small-scale businesses,
public and social organ-
izations, governmental
organizations
261 ‘organizations
committed to this pledge’
‘We will include a section on
the health and wellbeing
of employees within
annual reports and/or
websites. This will include
staff sickness absence
rates’.
http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20180201181435/https://
responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.
uk/pledges/pledge/? pl=13
See: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20180201175731/https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/The-
Public-Health-Responsibility-Deal-March-20111.pdf.
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This also highlights how the types of participants differed in the
two programmes. In the RD, the private sector (often multinational
businesses) dominated the Food and Alcohol Networks, with public
sector organizations and NGOs only slightly more prominent in the
Physical Exercise and Health at Work Networks. Ministers were
actively involved in encouraging firms to join the RD and make
pledges.23 Public health advocacy organizations felt compelled to
refuse invitations to participate in the RD due to what they saw as
conflicts of interest on the part of industry participants in the
design of pledges.14,18 In contrast, during the initial interactive
development phase of the AaH programme in 2012 and 2013,
involvement of representatives from a wide range of societal
interests created a broad level of tolerance, if not support,
among stakeholders.34 A wide range of local, regional and
national NGOs, many small and a few large businesses, and
public sector organisations joined, some of these by invitation,
others by their own initiative.
The most remarkable difference, however, is how the partners in
both programmes interpret the processes of networking, formulating
and implementing pledges, and monitoring progress. In the RD,
participant interviewees reported ‘playing it safe’ and a substantial
number of interviewees reported not doing anything particularly
new or different to their usual practice as a result of the RD. The
monitoring of activities against the pledges was almost entirely
focused on demonstrating the scale and reach of the RD (e.g. the
number of new pledges and organisations involved). Moreover, as
time progressed, partners expected the Government to provide more
leadership in order to ensure a ‘level playing field’ between partners,
and between partners and non-partners, and to give public recog-
nition for pledge-based achievements.30 Similar to the RD, AaH
interviewees also articulated a need for more interaction with, and
help and reward from, the Government including non-health
Ministries.31 In response, the Ministry of HWS promised to
‘discuss and take measures to remove obstacles in laws and regula-
tions’.19 Many AaH partners similar to the RD mentioned
organizing pre-existing activities, yet, they also described how the
pledges gave new impetus to implementing these pre-existing plans,
and do more. AaH partners performed several governance tasks:
some provided evidence, others contributed to policy development,
exercised advocacy, helped consensus building, acted as watch dogs,
provided services to members and to the public, acted as self-
regulators and/or were key in industrial relations in the health
sector.35 They described the pledge network processes as organic,
pragmatic and adaptive to local feedback. Instead of jointly
developing detailed project plans with specific, measurable,
achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) objectives between
local partner organisations, the pledge initiators conducted ad hoc
activities in direct contact with target groups in order to keep the
partners committed and not to lose partners through bureaucratic
procedures. These activities are accompanied by a high degree of
‘reflection-in-action’ generating participant feedback and adapting
activities accordingly, described by one initiator as ‘reflexive
monitoring’ (interview 25 April 2016). The absence of specific
pledge requirements created time and space for exploratory
networks of potential partners seeking mutual benefits before
deciding to engage in more entrepreneurial networks. The
interview data in AaH seem indicative of a general enthusiasm for
initiatives that the Programme Office frames as ‘disruptive
innovation’, and which participants regard as ‘system-break-
throughs’ that remove barriers to change and create room for
(social) innovation. In some pledge networks, this has boosted a
felt urgency to reorganize organizational procedures, rules of
engagement, the division of responsibilities and funding arrange-
ments. These processes contributed to increased number of
partners, domain-crossing pledge networks, awareness of the
relevance of health in different settings and sectors, and identifica-
tion of obstacles to innovation and new ways of working.31
Discussion
The comparative institutional analysis has generated two partial, yet
inter-related, explanations for the different compositions and
trajectories of the programmes: the nature of the micro-level
pledges and their formation; and the macro-level institutional
context, more specifically, the types of democratic institutions and
governance regimes in which the two programmes are embedded at
the meso-level of policy systems.
The nature of the pledges and their formation
Although both programmes rely on voluntary, trust-based pledges,
there is an important difference in how the RD and AaH pledges
were developed by government and perceived by the non-state
partners. Signing a pledge reflects the more or less credible
commitment of partners to health-related norms and values
(awareness) and perhaps the social approval and reputation that
they gain by doing so.9 We theorize that these micro-level pledges
can be located on a continuum between, on the one hand, ‘volun-
tarily’ entered (quasi-) contracts establishing rights and obligations
between actors with different resources and interests, and, on the
other, entirely ‘trust-based’ commitments between actors. What
matters for the exact location of the pledge on this continuum is
the degree to which the public and private actors engaged in a pledge
have internalized the promotion of good health (or the prevention of
negative health externalities) into their own activities and strategic
cost/benefit calculations in a credible way.
The RD pledges were perceived as ‘quasi-contractual’ relationships
between government and other actors to achieve public health goals,
notwithstanding the fact that government meant them to be
ultimately trust-based since there was limited government oversight
and no intention to resort to legislation. In AaH, pledges have
continued to be treated as trust-based commitments by civil society
actors towards (public) health goals. AaH seems to be flourishing in a
context in which public and private partners have learned to acknow-
ledge the fact that fast results cannot be expected and that the purpose
of the programme is more about initiating a societal movement
dedicated to the inclusion of health values and goals into the
strategic choices that pledge partners make, rather than necessarily
producing rapid, measurable results.
The impact of the institutional context
The placing of voluntary pledges (at the micro-level of social exchange
relations) on a continuum between quasi-contractual and entirely
trust-based commitments fits the two different meso-level governance
regimes and the macro-level democratic institutions. While the
Netherlands developed a consensual democracy with employer and
employee bodies co-formulating social policies with government, and
a long history of private provision of public tasks and self-regulation,
the United Kingdom depends on majoritarian democracy, with a
structural lack of trust in government and adversarial public-private
relations motivated by advocacy of, and resistance to, further privat-
ization. Pledges in the hierarchical, relatively centralized, governance
regime of the United Kingdom are likely to be regarded by non-gov-
ernmental actors as more quasi-contractual in character (and critiqued
accordingly for a lack of government supervision and control) while
pledges in the more consensual governance regime of the Netherlands
are likely to be perceived as more trust based. The RD and its pledges
evolved primarily in the space between the private market (business)
and central government, while in the Netherlands, the pledges were
developed and agreed in the more or less organized civil society sphere.
Thus one explanation for the gradual, unobtrusive winding down
of the RD from early 2015 and the continuation of the AaH until at
least 2021 may lie in the way that the two programmes were
developed and the role of central government in each process. In
the RD, the prime objective of the government was to negotiate
Comparative institutional analysis for public health 23
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/eurpub/article-abstract/28/suppl_3/19/5149568 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 16 N
ovem
ber 2018
‘deals’ with business and other actors that might improve public
health. Although it was clearly hoped that the RD would become
rooted in wider society, civil society organizations either refused to
engage or withdrew on the grounds that it was based on a funda-
mental conflict of interest between business and public health im-
peratives. By 2015, the independent evaluation had cast considerable
doubt on claims that the RD was achieving its health objectives and
would be likely to contribute to significant improvement in public
health. For example, the pledges tended to reflect activities that
partners were already pursuing, or interventions unlikely to be
effective.30,36–41
The AaH, on the other hand, was strongly associated with its
initiating social actors and was more public facing. Also, the
purpose of accountability was developmental and forward-looking
rather than focusing summatively on goal achievement. The AaH
Programme Office encouraged partners to be more ambitious, and
publicly share experience with other partners. This approach is
rooted in the more consensual political tradition of the
Netherlands which goes some way to explain the more horizontal,
‘trust-based’ nature of AaH. This has enabled AaH to evolve toward
a multi-lateral societal programme supported by a range of societal
groups with strong participation of civil society.
Conclusion
Comparative institutional analysis provides plausible explanations
for the convergence or divergence between countries’ policies and
trajectories, related to similarities or differences in their democratic
institutions and governance regimes. The main lesson from the case
for developing collaborative arrangements for public health is that
the generic trust-building and learning-based models of change in
WoS approaches require trust-generating institutional conditions. In
their absence, programmes based on WoS principles could do more
to create these conditions by implementing decentralised and small-
scale initiatives and agreements embedded in local communities and
face-to-face based networks.
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Key points
 The WoS approach of the WHO proposes a new ‘social
contract’ aimed at inducing both public and private actors
(governments, civil society and business) to take responsi-
bility for the co-production of economic utility and good
health.
 One manifestation of this approach are voluntary public–
private agreements such as the Public Health RD in England
and the AaH programme in the Netherlands.
 A systematic comparative analysis of similarities and differ-
ences in contextual pressures, and in actor networks and
institutional settings between the programmes helps
explain their different trajectories and draw lessons for an
institutionally compatible programme design.
 The English ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and adversarial state–
society relationships conditioned non-governmental parties
to see the pledges as controlling, quasi-contractual
agreements that were only partially lived up to, while the
Dutch consensual political tradition enabled a civil society-
based understanding and gradual acceptance of the pledges.
 The generic trust-building and learning-based models of
change in WoS approaches require trust-generating institu-
tional conditions. In their absence, programmes based on
WoS principles could do more to create these conditions
by implementing decentralized and small-scale initiatives
and agreements embedded in local communities and face-
to-face based networks.
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